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FIRST DOWN, GOAL TO GO:
ENFORCING THE NFL'S SALARY CAP USING THE
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the owners of the twenty-eight' National Football League
("NFL" or "League") teams and the National Football League Players
Association ("NFLPA") settled some of their long-standing labor disputes
and entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").2  The
agreement contains a "salary cap" clause limiting the amount of money
each team may spend on salaries for both veteran
3 and rookie players.4
Initially, the salary cap was greeted with both resentment and
acceptance from players, coaches, and management.5  The NFLPA
officially considers the cap a benefit to the players. 6 The spending limits
imposed upon teams, however, have forced some high-paid veteran players
out of jobs, causing discontent among many players. 7  The initial
resentment among several general managers and coaches was so severe
I. When the agreement was ratified, the National Football League had only 28 teams. See
THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK 277 (Chris
McCloskey & Chuck Garrity, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK]. The
Carolina Panthers and the Jacksonville Jaguars joined the NFL in the 1995-96 season, raising
the number of teams to 30. Id. at 275.
2. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000 (1993) [hereinafter CBA].
3. Id. art. XXIV.
4. Id. art. XVII.
5. Ninety-four percent of the NFL players voted "yes" on the 1993 CBA. See Gene
Upshaw, Upshaw Taking Pride in NFL Salary Structure, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 22, 1994, at
C15. Additionally, NFLPA assistant executive director Doug Allen stated, "We think it's going
to be a healthy system for the players .... " Jeff Babineau, NFL Seeks to Level the Playing
Field with Team Salary Caps, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1993, at C13. Despite the
overwhelming vote and support from the NFLPA, however, many players are dissatisfied with
the way things have turned out. See S.A. Paolantonio, A Lot of Players Would Just Love to
Scrap the Cap Their Union Accepted, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 8, 1994, at C9 (detailing the
frustration of dissatisfied players).
6. NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw stated that the NFLPA "feel[s] excited about
the system. We know that it has worked very well." Larry Weisman, Union, NFL at Odds over
Little These Days, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 1996, at 4C.
7. See Paolantonio, supra note 5, at C9.
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that NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue warned them that they could be
fined $10,000 for complaining about the salary cap.8
The salary cap's imperfections and gaping loopholes have since been
widely criticized by owners, players, coaches, and observers of the game.9
Recently, many owners have attacked each other for actions that may
violate the "spirit" of the salary cap, rather than its express language.
Specifically, owners employing various salary accounting and player
management techniques to circumvent the cap's financial limits have been
accused of operating contrary to the intent, purpose, and goal of the salary
cap. Many fear that these actions, while bringing present individual
success to some teams, may eventually cause severe problems for the NFL
in the future.1' Despite these concerns, the practice of circumventing the
salary cap continues. In fact, some NFL insiders consider allegations of
cap circumvention laughable, contending that there is no such thing as a
"spirit" of the agreement.1 2
This Comment contends that a "spirit" does in fact exist in an
agreement such as the CBA and that it is embodied in the intent, purpose,
and goals which the parties contemplated when they drafted the agreement.
Furthermore, this Comment argues that several teams do in fact violate the
spirit of the salary cap through various circumvention techniques, and that
they should not be allowed to do so with impunity. This Comment
suggests that an aggrieved team, or perhaps the League itself, might be
able to use a basic tenet of contract law-the "Implied Covenant of Good
8. See Manny Topol, Tags Gags NFL Team Officials, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1994, at A71.
9. Former Tampa Bay Buccaneers coach Sam Wyche stated, "All of us are going to have to
let go players who should be on our teams . I..." Id. Sports agent Steve Feldman also stated
that "[t]he cap is absolutely the worst thing that ever happened to pro football ...." Gordon
Forbes, Cap Critics Vent Frustration; Agents, Older Players Say Pay System Unbalanced, USA
TODAY, May 5, 1994, at 10C.
10. The NFL's vice president of player relations stated that "[tihe spirit of the law has been
broken .... [T]here are six or seven teams taking advantage of the flexibility [of the salary cap
provisions] and taking advantage to excess." Len Pasquarelli, Notebooks; Inside the NFL;
Salary Cap Flexibility Can Undermine Intent, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 1, 1995, at 10E.
Commenting on the signing of Pro Bowl cornerback Deion Sanders in 1995 by the San
Francisco Forty-Niners, New Orleans Saints executive vice president Jim Miller said, "I think
there's something wrong out there, and it will come out eventually. There's a dozen teams out
there who feel the same way we do .... The whole thing smells." Brian Allee-Walsh, Deion's
Deal Challenged: Saints Want 49ers Contract Probed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept.
22, 1994, at DI.
11. See Bill Plaschke, Bad Signs for the NFL; The Furious Free Agent Flurry Has Signaled
Warnings That This Is the Eve of Destruction, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at C3.
12. Agent Leigh Steinberg stated, "There is no 'spirit of the salary cap.' There is only the
salary cap. That's like the IRS saying someone violated the spirit of the tax code." Mike
Fisher, Never Follow Logic: A Review of the '95 Season Not Found in Game Summaries, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 28, 1995, at C6.
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Faith and Fair Dealing"13-to force defiant teams to observe the spirit and
the letter of the salary cap.
Part II outlines the basic structures and functions of the NFL, the
evolution of the salary cap, and the intent, purpose, and goals of the
owners and players when they agreed to a cap. This discussion also
includes the current status of the CBA and the effect recent developments
may have on teams and players. In addition, Part II explains how teams
use various financial and player management techniques to circumvent the
salary cap.
Part III briefly chronicles the common law use of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, its use in professional sports, and
its possible application to the CBA. Specifically, this Part illustrates how
prior federal court rulings involving the NFL may have important
implications for the contemporary application of this covenant. This Part
suggests that a court may read the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into the CBA so as to encourage or even to require a stricter
adherence to the intended effect of the salary cap. This Comment
concludes that unless the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
can be used to prevent the use of salary cap circumvention techniques,
their continued use could result in a potentially bleak future for the NFL.
II. INSIDE THE NFL SALARY CAP
Before discussing how certain NFL teams may violate the spirit of
the CBA, it might be helpful to provide some background information.
Specifically, the evolution of the labor/management relationship in
American professional football is important to understand, as such
information will reveal why the CBA and salary cap exist today. An
understanding of the history of the NFL leading up to the CBA and the
salary cap are indeed necessary before arguing that their "spirit" has
somehow been violated.
A. From the "Galloping Ghost" to "Prime Time"
American professional football has grown in popularity since its
inception in 1920.14 Originally, professional football was a simple pastime
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. The American Professional Football Conference ("APFC") was founded on August 20,
1920, in Canton, Ohio. 1996 REcORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 266. On September 17,
1920, the APFC changed its name to the American Professional Football Association ("APFA").
Id. On June 24, 1922, the APFA changed its name to the National Football League. Id. at 267.
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that allowed heroes of college football to continue performing their awe-
inspiring feats of athleticism.1 However, like other billion dollar sports
leagues, the NFL has outgrown its roots as a simple pastime.
Today, the reality is that professional football is consumed by
economic forces, market factors, and struggles between labor and
management. Once played only by full-time athletes, professional football
is now comprised of players who are part athlete and part entrepreneur.
Even one of the game's most gifted athletes, Deion "Prime Time" Sanders,
recognized that "[s]ports isn't sports anymore. It's all a business. I'm not
even thinking about football."' 16 The football games enjoyed by millions of
fans today are the result of seventy-seven years of growth in the League's
popularity, expansion to numerous cities, and the creation of operating
rules and procedures intended to preserve the integrity and viability of the
17game.
For most of its history, the League unilaterally established the terms
and conditions under which it would conduct its operations, with little or
no input from the players.' 8  When players challenged the League's
operations and rules regarding their rights, most were in the form of
allegations that the League violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
15. Perhaps the most famous of the early professional football stars was University of
Illinois All-American Harold "Red" Grange, given the name "Galloping Ghost" when he ran for
four touchdowns in 12 minutes against the University of Michigan. Dave Dorr, Through the
Years: Surprise! Surprise!, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 1996, at IID. In 1925, Grange
joined the Chicago Bears franchise and was the main attraction in the first NFL games to draw
crowds larger than 30,000 people. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 267. College
football stars such as All-Americans Jim Thorpe, Ernie Nevers, Bronko Nagurski, Don Hutson,
and Sammy Baugh carried the fledgling League through its first 30 years. Id. at 266-68.
16. Ed Bouchette, NFL NOTEBOOK: Free-Spending DeBartolo Assails Jones' Don't
Share-Wealth Stand, PITT. POST GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 1995, at C7.
17. Gauged by revenues, the NFL is one of the most popular professional sports leagues in
American history. In 1995, the NFL's gross revenues (including ticket sales and broadcasting
revenues) topped $2 billion. MARTIN J. GREENBERG, I SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.07(10)
(Cumulative Supp. 1995) [hereinafter SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 1995]. The NFL's paid attendance
reached over 18 million in 1994. Id. With the inclusion of Fox Sports as one of the NFL's
broadcasters, the League's television revenues alone are worth more than $1.6 billion from 1993
to 1997. Barry Horn, NFC Games Will Air on Fox Stations: Network Reportedly Gets 4-Year,
$1.6 Billion Deal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 18, 1993, at IA. In 1980, that amount was
only $166.5 million. NFL BACKGROUND INFORMATION (National Football League ed., 1993)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal). The NFL is televised in
more than 60 countries. Id. In fact, a 1991 Sports Illustrated poll indicated that professional
football was the most interesting sport to the American people. Id.
18. Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of
Reason, and the Doctrine ofAncillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 943, 950 (1988).
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Act.' 9 By 1980, however, such claims had been resoundingly defeated in
court and were largely obscured by other issues.20 This was due in part to
Congress' decision to grant sports leagues a special statutory exemption
from certain claims arising under section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 1 Thus
Congress gave what amounts to its approval of the use of certain economic
anti-competition operating rules for sports leagues.
The current CBA is a product of years of antitrust claims by players
against the League, culminating in one of the biggest labor-management
clashes in professional sports history.22  Years of unsuccessful effort by
the NFLPA to modify or eliminate rules limiting a player's ability to move
voluntarily to another team eventually led to a player strike in 1987.23 In
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 1 provides that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
20. In 1953, a district court held that the NFL violated 15 U.S.C. § I by prohibiting
member clubs from selling telecasting rights to their games in the home territories of other
member clubs when the other member club was visiting. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp.
319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Seven years later, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle decided to abandon
the old practice of allowing each club to sell its television rights separately, and proposed
instead to have the League sell a single package of the pooled rights to all NFL games. Roberts,
supra note 18, at 951. In a subsequent lawsuit, the same district court judge ruled that pooled
sales violated the terms of his 1953 ruling but did not hold that the contract violated 15 U.S.C. §
1. United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Subsequently, the NFL obtained
from Congress a special statutory exemption for the League's sale of pooled television rights for
"sponsored telecasting." See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Because of this statutory exemption, the
substantive effect of the court's 1953 decision and the application of section I to league controls
over television marketing have been largely forgotten. Roberts, supra note 18, at 951. For a
full discussion of the League's history with the Sherman Antitrust Act, see Roberts, supra note
18, at 951.
21. Congress amended 15 U.S.C. § 1291 in 1996 (Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800,
U.S.C.C.A.N. (80 Stat.) 1515, § 6(b)(1)) specifically to authorize the NFL-AFL merger. This
amendment effectively overruled the decision in United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.
Pa. 1953).
22. Most of the challenges related to rules such as the right of first refusal/compensation
components of the League's rules, the college draft, the lack of free agency, player contracts,
and preseason pay rules. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (holding that the NFL draft violates the rule of reason); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp.
1000 (D. Minn. 1975) (holding that, although not per se illegal, the Rozelle Rule violates the
rule of reason); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82-83 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that the NFL
draft and the Rozelle Rule are not justified by the rule of reason); see also Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996) (holding that the League's conduct in unilaterally
imposing fixed salary for developmental squad players within the CBA fell within the scope of
nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust liability).
23. See Bob Oates & Rich Roberts, With No Talk of Settlement, NFL Players Taking a
Walk, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1987, at C3; see also Strike Chronology, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 16, 1987, at 13B (detailing the 1987 NFL players' strike).
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response, the team owners fielded replacement players ("scabs"), 24 losing
millions of dollars in television and ticket sale revenues but playing the
games nonetheless.
2 5
Disheartened by the owners' willingness to field scab teams and
thwarted by courts in their attempts at judicial relief, the players returned26
to work without a labor agreement. From 1987 to 1993 the League
operated under a unilaterally imposed set of rules that greatly limited
mobility, much to the dismay of the NFLPA.27  Further efforts by the
NFLPA were defeated by a non-statutory labor exemption to the Sherman
Act which was carved out by the courts in rejecting players' challenges to
the League-imposed rules.
28
In 1989, individual player antitrust challenges culminated in the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Powell v. NFL.29  The suit
was filed by NFLPA president Marvin Powell on behalf of both the
NFLPA and individual players challenging virtually every element of the
League's player restraint system on antitrust grounds.30  The court held,
however, that the "ongoing collective bargaining relationship" between the
24. See Gary Myers, NFL '87: It Was a Very Bad Year: Replacement Season Would Be
Fitting After Strike-Torn Campaign, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 28, 1987, at 6B; Bob Oates,
Pro Football; The Replacement Games Are Now Looming Bigger and Bigger, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
25, 1987, at C3.
25. See P.J. Bednarski, 'Replacement' Football Games Bad News for TV, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1987, at Financial (reporting on the drastic decline in television ratings for games
featuring replacement players as well as the financial losses suffered by teams and TV
networks); see also Mark Asher & Michael Wilbon, NFL Strikers Return, but Can't Play;
Management Sets Another Weekend of Replacement Games, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1987, at A l.
26. Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the NFL-NFLPA
Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 397, 400 (1996).
27. Id.
28. The Supreme Court has held that in order to properly accommodate the congressional
policy favoring free competition in business markets with the congressional policy favoring
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, certain
union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust
sanctions. Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975); Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965). Furthermore, restraints agreed to by players' unions and
incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement negotiated in good faith and at arms length
are within the nonstatutory labor exemption. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 952; see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978) (approving the settlement and implicitly
approving the collective bargaining agreement discussed in Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977)); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976);
Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
29. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
30. This suit challenged virtually every element of the League's player restraint system,
including the college draft, the right of first refusal/compensation scheme, and the standard
player contract, alleging that each provision unlawfully restrained trade in the market for
players' services. Id. at 1295.
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League and the NFLPA rendered the rules exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. 3 1 The practical effect of the Eighth Circuit's ruling was to
solidify the non-statutory antitrust exemption that the League enjoyed,
further obstructing individual player challenges as long as the "ongoing
collective bargaining relationship" existed.32 To combat the effect of the
non-statutory exemption, the NFLPA officially decertified itself as the
players' representative in 1992, thus terminating the "ongoing collective
bargaining relationship" with the NFL. This action cleared the way for
individual players to bring suit.
33
The first such suit was McNeil v. NFL,3 4 an action similar to
Powell.35 In McNeil, eight players claimed that the League's "Right of
First Refusal/Compensation Rules" under the "Plan B Rules" 36 limited the
movement of football players after their contracts expired.37 The players
alleged that these restrictions constituted an agreement among the NFL
and its then twenty-eight member clubs to unreasonably restrain
competition for the services of professional football players, thus violating
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court sided with the
players and ruled that when not protected by the non-statutory exemption
for an ongoing bargaining relationship, eradicated when the NFLPA
decertified itself, the League's rules indeed violated antitrust laws.3 9 Four
of the eight players in the McNeil suit were awarded damages and each
was declared an unrestricted free agent.
40
The result in McNeil led defensive end Reggie White and four other
players to file a similar class action suit against the NFL seeking damages
31. Id. at 1303.
32. McCormick, supra note 26, at 401.
33. Id. at 415.
34. 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 169,982 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
35. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
36. Under this system, a player's current team could retain him when his contract expired
by matching any offer made by another team. McCormick, supra note 26, at 403. If the current
team elected not to match the offer, it was still entitled to "compensation" from the new team in
the form of draft choices. Id. at 403-04. While the Powell case was pending, the NFL
unilaterally implemented its "Plan B" system, an attempt to water down the existing system,
presumably in recognition that the first refusal/compensation scheme was vulnerable to an
antitrust attack. Id. at 416. "Plan B" allowed teams to "protect" 37 of their 55 players by
applying the first refusal/compensation system only to those players. Id. The remaining players
were accorded free agency status and were permitted to negotiate freely for their services. Id.
37. McNeil, 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,982, at 68,769.
38. Id.
39. McCormick, supra note 26, at 402.
40. Id.
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and free agency.4 1 Cognizant of the likely result after McNeil, the NFL
and NFLPA settled the case on February 26, 1993.42  The settlement
created a large fund from which certain players were to receive damages,
provided free agency for the first time to many players, reduced the
college draft, increased the minimum pay scales, and instituted a veteran
and rookie salary cap system.43  It also became the blue print for the
League and NFLPA's new collective bargaining agreement, which was
ratified when the NFLPA officially recertified itself as the players'
representative.
44
That agreement sets out the basic entitlements and limitations
available to players and owners. Most notable among the 200 pages of
"therefores" and "whereases" is the "salary cap" provision, a clause which
limits the amount of money each team may spend on player salaries. 45 The
NFL has benefited from the CBA in many ways, not the least of which was
the end to bitter and protracted litigation involving the League and its46
players. The security of having a CBA in place at least through the year47
2000 provides a strong foundation for the League's expansion to new
48cities. The CBA is responsible for creating more than 100 new jobs for
players in the NFL as well as adding more than eighty million dollars
annually in player salaries and benefits. 49  Additionally, the CBA is
credited with aiding the development of the "World League of
Professional Football," an international league of teams playing American
football, which created 200 more player jobs outside the NFL.' The CBA
41. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1395-96 (D. Minn. 1993); McCormick, supra
note 26, at 402.
42. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1395.
43. Id. at 1412-16.
44. McCormick, supra note 26, at 402.
45. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV.
46. Commissioner Paul Tagliabue said, "I think everyone is relieved to put an end to
protracted litigation, which is time-consuming, tedious and a diversion of energy from more
constructive pursuits." Larry Weisman, NFL, Players End Five-Year Fight; Free Agency,
Salary Cap Major Issues, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1993, at IC.
47. CBA, supra note 2, art. LVIII, § 2. The NFL and NFLPA have recently agreed to
extend the CBA, possibly as far as the year 2002. Dave Sell, NFL Notebook, WASH. POST, Oct.
2, 1996, at F6.
48. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NFL PLAYER SYSTEM (National Football League
Public Relations ed., Nov. 1994), at I (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Journal) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS].
49. Id.
50. Id.
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also helped the NFL secure lucrative long-term contracts with television
networks for the rights to broadcast NFL games.51
The White settlement and resulting CBA was heralded as "radically
alter[ing] the NFL's system of player restraints and provid[ing]
unprecedented free agency to NFL players."52 The players gained the free
agency for which they had fought for many years. The owners, on the
other hand, were able to implement a salary cap, a mechanism whereby
each team could control player costs.
B. The "Xs and O's" of the Salary Cap
Giving players free agency in 1993 meant, for some, the opportunityS53
for increased salaries. The League and players recognized that in a
system with unrestricted free agency, teams with greater revenue potential
would consistently outbid less affluent teams for talented players.
Accordingly, a "hard" salary cap54 was thought necessary to protect the
competitive balance.55  The CBA therefore included two distinct
mechanisms limiting the amount of money teams could spend on player
salaries and benefits, and a third mechanism to enforce the salary cap.
Each works hand-in-hand with the system of restraining player movement
in an effort to decrease the economic advantage enjoyed by some teams.
1. Article XXIV: Guaranteed League-Wide Salary, Salary Cap and
Minimum Team Salary
Article XXIV creates a league-wide salary system that includes a
minimum and maximum amount teams may spend on player salaries and
benefits.56 In effect, it divides up the NFL pie, determining how much of
51. Id. In December 1993, Fox Television Network paid the NFL $1.58 billion for the
rights to televise NFC games for four years, while NBC agreed to pay $880 million per year to
broadcast AFC games. Jerry Magee, Fox Will Be Feather in the NFL's New Salary Cap, SAN
DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Dec. 22, 1993, at Dl.
52. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1396.
53. Larry Weisman, Free Agency Drives Players' Salaries Up, USA TODAY, Sept. 29,
1995, at 6C.
54. A "hard" salary cap prescribes an absolute ceiling on the amount of money a team can
pay out in all player costs, whether signing new players or resigning current ones, and a team
may not exceed this amount, supposedly, under any circumstance. A "soft" salary cap, by
contrast, allows the team to exceed the cap amount when resigning their own players. See Alan
M. Levine, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for the
Professional Sports Leagues, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243, 246 (1995).
55. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48, at 2.
56. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV. Player salaries include base salaries, all bonuses, and
deferred compensation. Id. art. XXIV, § 1(c). Benefits can include pension funding, group
1997]
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the League's defined gross revenues ("DGR") will be spent on all player
costs in a given season.5 7 The DGR is calculated by adding the revenue
generated League-wide from ticket sales and broadcast rights to NFL58
games.
Although the CBA was in effect for the 1993 season, 59 the salary cap
and minimum salary provisions were specifically excluded from operation
during that season. Instead, the parties anticipated activation of those
provisions only if the aggregate amount spent by all teams on player costs
in a given season equaled or surpassed sixty-seven percent of the DGR.
61
However, with the possibility of a cap looming, the uncapped year of 1993• • 62
saw massive spending on free agents. Teams spent an incredible seventy
percent of the DGR on player costs.63  Thus, 1994 became the first
"capped" season. 6 4
The actual amount of the cap is determined as an agreed-upon
percentage of the DGR. The cap amount is determined by projecting the
DGR for a given season (based on the DGR for the previous season),
subtracting therefrom the projected amount to be spent League-wide on
player benefits, multiplying that number by the agreed-upon percentage,
and dividing the result by the number of teams playing in the League that
year.66 For example, the projected DGR for 1994 was $1.7 billion.6 7 The
agreed-upon number in the CBA for the first year during which the cap
was in effect was sixty-four percent of the DGR.68 With twenty-eight NFL
teams that season, the aggregate amount allocated for player salaries and
benefits was a little more than $1.09 billion, or about $39 million per club
($34.6 million for salaries, $4.4 million for benefits).69 In 1995, the CBAallowed teams to spend only sixty-three percent of the DGR on player
insurance programs, injury protection, workers compensation, per diem amounts, moving and
travel expenses, post-season pay, medical costs, and severance pay. Id. art. XXIV, § 1(b).
57. Id. art. XXIV, § 1(a).
58. Id.
59. Id. art. LVIII, § 1.
60. Id. art. XXIV, § 2.
61. Id.
62. See Brian E. Dickerson, The Evolution of Free Agency in the National Football
League: Unilateral and Collective Bargaining Restrictiveness, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 165, 184 (Spr.
1996).
63. Id.
64. See Magee, supra note 51, at D1.
65. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 4(a).
66. Id.
67. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 1995, supra note 17, § 1.07(10), at 78.
68. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 4(a)(1).
69. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 1995, supra note 17, § 1.07(10), at 78.
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CBA will be the greater of (1) $2 million per team; (2? 3.5% of the DGR;
or (3) the amount of the previous year's rookie cap. The CBA further
restricts the salary potential of new players by limiting salary increases to
twenty-five percent of the first-year salary, exclusive of bonus amounts,
82
and prohibiting renegotiation of new player contracts for one year
following the initial signing.
83
3. Article XXV: Enforcement of the Salary Cap and Entering Player Pool
The possibility that teams would find ways to circumvent the salary
cap was not unforeseen by the parties who drafted these provisions. The
CBA contains a separate article specifically governing the enforcement of
the salary cap and entering player pool restrictions, addressing
circumvention as well. In general, article XXV (1) prohibits teams from
entering into contracts with undisclosed terms or unreported payments85 (2)
states the understanding that teams not enter contracts with players
designed to defeat the purposes of the parties;86 and (3) establishes a
mechanism to review and punish such transgressions.
87
Perhaps the most intriguing section of this article is the second section
anticipating possible attempts to circumvent the salary cap. The
Circumvention Clause 88 prohibits teams from entering into player contracts
with "terms that are designed to serve the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the intention of the parties as reflected by (a) the provisions.
. with respect to [DGR], Salary Cap, Entering Player Pool, and Minimum
Team Salary, and (b) any other term or provision of [the] Agreement."
89
Furthermore, the same paragraph states that "any conduct permitted by
[the] Agreement shall not be considered to be a violation of this
provision."
90
At first glance, the section seems logical. The teams agreed not to
circumvent the salary cap, and it is not circumvented if the rules allow the
81. CBA, supra note 2, art. XVII, § 3(a).
82. Id. art. XVII, § 4(e).
83. Id. art. XVI1, § 4(f).
84. Id. art. XXV.
85. Id. art. XXV, § 1.
86. Id. art. XXV, § 2.
87. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXV, §§ 3-7.
88. Id. art. XXV, § 2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
FIRST DOWN, GOAL TO GO
costs.7 0 That year, the DGR rose to more than $2 billion, creating a cap of
approximately $42 million ($37.1 million for salaries and $4.9 million for
benefits) for the League's expanded slate of thirty teams.
71
In a season during which the salary cap is in effect, the CBA also
provides a guaranteed League-wide minimum salary of at least fifty-eight72
percent of the actual DGR. More precisely, the players, in the aggregate,
must receive at least fifty-eight percent of the NFL revenue pie. In
addition, the CBA provides that each team must pay not less than fifty
percent of the projected DGR (less projected benefits) in a capped year.
This provision creates a minimum amount that teams must spend in player
costs. The practical effect of this requirement is to force the teams that
historically have paid lower salaries to pay higher individual salaries and• 74
maintain higher team salaries.
2. Article XVII: Entering Player Pool
A second salary-limiting mechanism created by the CBA is the
"Entering Player Pool," or rookie salary cap. 75 The rookie salary cap is a
League-wide limit on the amount of money teams can spend to sign
drafted and undrafted rookies in a given year.76 The amount is determined
by the CBA and is also included in the total amount available for player
costs under the salary cap provision of Article XXIV.
77
Unlike the League-wide salary cap, the rookie salary cap provision
went into effect for the 1993 season. 78 That year the teams could spend no
more than $2 million each to sign entering players. 79 Unless the rookie
cap is abolished by the League, 80 the amount in the remaining years of the
70. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 4(a)(2).
71. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 1995, supra note 17, § 1.07(10), at 78. The League expanded
to 30 teams in 1995. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 275.
72. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 3.
73. Id. art. XXIV, § 5(a).
74. Gene Upshaw, responding to criticism of CBA's salary system, stated, "We designed
this system to force historically cheap teams such as Cincinnati, Tampa Bay, New England,
Pittsburgh and Seattle to spend more on veteran players .... Upshaw, supra note 5, at C 15.
75. CBA, supra note 2, art. XVII.
76. Id. art. XVII, § 1(a).
77. Id. art. XXIV, § 1(c)(i).
78. Id. art. XVII, § 2.
79. Id. art. XVII, § 3(a).
80. The NFL may remove the Entering Player Pool at its option in any capped or uncapped
year upon 60 days notice to the NFLPA prior to the draft date. Id. art. XVII, § 2. Additionally,
in a capped year, if a club spends more than the amount allocated to rookies that year, it must
pay an equal amount to its veteran players. Id.
1997]
FIRST DOWN, GOAL TO GO
conduct. However, this section may be a mere tautology, as the two
clauses may operate to cancel one another. The first clause is aimed at the
state of mind of a team91 when it enters into a contract, prohibiting conduct
undertaken with the "purpose" of avoiding the intention of the parties to
the CBA. The second clause, however, disregards state of mind and holds
not voidable any conduct allowed by the terms and provisions of the CBA.
The problem is that a contract can follow the terms and provisions of the
CBA, yet still have been motivated by the goal of circumventing the spirit,
or intent, of the salary cap.
Ironically, applying this section to conduct that is technically
permitted but effectively circumvents the salary cap means that little
"enforcement" power actually exists. Indeed, by attempting to avoid the
possibility that teams would seek to circumvent the cap, the parties may
have provided impunity for the teams who do. Therefore, it is not
surprising that a phrase as amorphous and uncertain as "the spirit of the
salary cap" has been used to define alleged violations. As will be
discussed in this comment, the conduct that has become the basis for
claiming the "spirit" of the CBA has been violated is arguably the product
of this section.
4. Extension of the CBA
Recently, the NFL and NFLPA agreed to a two-year extension of the
CBA with an option for another two years. 92 The extension received near
unanimous approval from both the teams 93 and the NFLPA,94 likely
because each considers the CBA vital to preserving the growing popularity
of the NFL.95  Equally important to players and teams, the DGR
percentage was raised from sixty-two percent in 1996, the third year of the
91. The "state of mind" of a team refers to that of the team's owner (or other person or
persons responsible for making the team's salary and player decisions) when negotiating
contracts with players and planning for the team's salary cap commitments.
92. Len Pasquarelli, NFL Labor Extension Is Reached; Tentative Agreement Needs
Approval of Owners, Union, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 20, 1995, at C 1.
93. The teams approved the extension by a vote of 25 to 5. Ed Werder, Owners Agree to
'99 Salary Cap, Jones Says Extension of Bargaining Agreement Important, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 10, 1996, at 7B. Even over-extended owners such as Jerry Jones agreed it was "in
the best interests of the NFL ... to extend the labor agreement .... " Id.
94. NFLPA President Gene Upshaw stated, "We were trying to provide the league with the
tools it needed to get the job done [in negotiations with TV networks] and the extension is one
of those tools." Sell, supra note 47, at F6.
95. See id.; see also Werder, supra note 93, at 7B, reporting that the NFL considers the
extension of the CBA a "pivotal component in maintaining the strength of the league . . .
substantially improv[ing] the NFL's leverage in negotiating long-term television contract after
the 1997 season."
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96 9
cap, to sixty-three for each year until 2000.97 The new agreement has the
possibility of extending the CBA as far as the year 2002, although each
side has the option of canceling the deal in December of either 1997 or
1998.98
Perhaps the most interesting development of the new agreement is
that the 1999 season will no longer be "uncapped" as originally planned,
forcing teams to re-work contracts that commit large salaries and bonuses
to players that season. 99 Forty-Niner president Carmen Policy commented
that teams who were planning on paying out huge amounts in 1999 were
treating that year as a "toxic dump site."' 00  Accordingly, these "dump
sites" will have to be cleaned up.
C. Intent, Purposes, and Goals
It is evident from the provisions of the White settlement that were
ultimately incorporated into the CBA that the players and owners had
distinct and even conflicting reasons for entering into the CBA. The stated
purpose of the salary cap and player restraint system in the CBA was to
"strike a fair and reasonable balance between the interests of the players,
clubs, and fans." '0 The players wanted a larger piece of the NFL revenue
pie, which they gained by increasing the minimum salaries and the
percentage of the League's total revenues allotted to player costs.' °2 In
addition, the players gained increased freedom to choose a team through
the institution of free agency. 103 The owners, on the other hand, sought a
level playing field that would enable all clubs to "compete effectively for
players and ensure some continuity."' 104  The owners sought to strike a
96. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 4(a)(3).
97. Pasquarelli, supra note 92, at IC.
98. Sell, supra note 47, at F6.
99. Pasquarelli, supra note 92, at IC.
100. Werder, supra note 93, at 7B. The Dallas Cowboys, for example, have a League-
leading $33.65 million committed to seven players in 1999. Id. Almost $17 million of the
Cowboys' "toxic waste" is dedicated to quarterback Troy Aikman and cornerback/wide receiver
Deion Sanders alone. Id.
101. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48, at 1.
102. Under the 1993 CBA, NFL players were scheduled to receive at least 58% of the
League's DGR. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 3. Players received 63% in 1994 and 1995,
and will receive as much as 64% under the terms of the new extension. Pasquarelli, supra note
92, at Cl. By comparison, Major League Baseball players receive only 52% of its League's
revenues, and National Basketball Association players receive only 53%. Upshaw, supra note
5, at Ci5.
103. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48, at 1.
104. Id.
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"competitive balance" between the teams, both athletically and
economically.
10 5
Indeed, it was thought that a salary cap would allow all clubs to
compete "on a level financial playing field with equal opportunities to
build a winning team.' 1°6  Team owners thought a cap would "control
costs" and halt "escalating salaries."' 0 7  Although not officially
represented in the negotiations but an important component nonetheless,
the concern on behalf of the fans was to provide "high quality competition,
close games, and exciting divisional races."'
' 0 8
The salary cap was thought to be the mechanism to accomplish these
goals, and was therefore one of the most sought-after provisions by team
owners during the settlement negotiations. 109 The salary cap was so
important that the owners were willing to give the players free agency for
the first time in order to get it.' 10 However, clubs would not have agreed
to such a radical change without a system that also protected competitive
balance. The idea was that if each team was allowed to spend only a
defined, financially feasible amount, the less profitable teams would be
able to compete with the more profitable teams for the best players.
In sum, the purpose of the salary cap, from the owners' perspective,
was three-fold: (1) increase on-field competition; (2) decrease the off-
field economic advantage enjoyed by large revenue-producing teams; and
(3) create a product that would grow in popularity and ensure the long term
viability of the game. 12
105. Id. at 2. In fact, even before the institution of the salary cap, the League was
defending its unilaterally imposed operating procedures and player restraint system from
antitrust attacks on the grounds that they were necessary to maintain this competitive balance.
See McNeil, 1992-2 Trade Cas. 69,982, at 68,770.
According to defendants, competitive balance means that all of the NFL teams are
of sufficiently comparable playing strength to provide competitive and high
quality games that are close, exciting and well-played, and thus interesting to the
fans. Defendants claim that the challenged Plan B rules, in conjunction with other
NFL rules, strengthen the appeal of the NFL's football product; otherwise, a less
attractive NFL product would cause fans to lose interest in watching NFL football,
and as a result, the revenues generated by live attendance and television rights
fees would decline.
Id.
106. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48, at 2.
107. Jeff Legwold, In NFL, It Sometimes Doesn't Pay to Stay, TENNESSEAN, Nov. 12,
1995, at 7C.
108. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48, at 1.
109. Legwold, supra note 107, at 7C.
110. Id.
11. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48, at I.
112. Legwold, supra note 107, at 7C.
1997]
464 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
These lofty goals were undoubtedly inspired in part by the long-
standing notion that teams from "large football markets" such as New
York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, and San Francisco had a competitive
advantage when it came to generating revenue and attracting players."1
3
Originally, the teams located in these highly populated areas had a larger
potential fan base, possibly leading to more revenue from ticket sales and
television rights. 114 In a free market for player services, the effect of such
an economic advantage is that the best players would always go to the
most affluent teams. As a result, these teams would consistently beat the
"small market teams" on and off the field. To some degree, this theory
held true for many years as the largest source of team revenue was
television rights to home games, sold by each club individually. 115 When
the NFL pooled its sales of television rights and began dividing the
revenues equally among each franchise, the problem of the disparate
distribution of these revenues seemed to be alleviated.116  The NFL's
revenue sharing policy that distributes the income generated from ticket
sales and NFL licensed films and merchandise has helped to minimize the
revenue generating incongruity among teams.
117
113. Sportswriter Jim Souhan, discussing the effects of free agency without a cap on
salaries, adeptly recognized that "[tihe combined weight of all the star players flocking to
[teams in] California and New York would topple those states into the sea .... The New York
(large-market) Giants would beat the Green Bay (small-market) Packers the way the U.S.
basketball team beat Cuba." Jim Souhan, Players Appear to Hold Big Lead in Trial with NFL,
STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 30, 1992, at IC.
114. Determining a team's fan base is unpredictable. It is a function of many factors,
including the city's population, the current roster of players, the owner, team marketing, and
perhaps most importantly, the team's on-field success. For example, despite the fact that Los
Angeles is one of the largest cities by population, the Raiders' fickle fan base was often
described as "modest to low;" 90,000 could be expected to show up for a playoff game, but less
than 30,000 might show up to see a game against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Jim Murray, Al
Proves Them Wrong: You Can Go Home Again, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1995, at C 1.
115. The League's television revenues totaled $1.08 billion in 1995, with each team
receiving $38.6 million, and $1.14 billion in 1996, with each team receiving $40.7 million.
Prepared Statement of Paul Tagliabue Comm 'r of the Nat '1 Football League Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Tuesday, January 23, 1996, Fed. News Serv. Cong. Hearing
Testimonies, 1996 WL 735236 (Jan. 23, 1996).
116. Green Bay Packers President Bob Harlan said, "The Packers are competitive . . .
because of revenue sharing," referring to the fact that 63% of the teams' income is from the TV
money shared by the League members. Bruce Adams, The NFL Team of the People; There Are
Large-Market Teams, Small-Market Teams, and There Are the Green Bay Packers, a Throwback
to the 1920s, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Oct. 20, 1996, at 1 IC.
117. See Pete Dougherty, Packers Want Luxury Revenue Sharing, GANNETr NEWS SER.,
Feb. 14, 1996; Curt Brown, For Love of Money; Jones Irks Others with Side Deals, STAR-TRIm.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 13, 1995, at IC. Revenue sharing has been credited with leading
to "roughly even prosperity for most clubs." Bob Gates, NFL Loses Architect; He Made
Football Modern, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1996, at Cl.
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Today, the distinction between large and small market teams with
regard to revenue generating potential seems less indicative of on-field
success. "Small market teams" are no longer necessarily at a
disadvantage, and market size plays a decreasing role in determining a
team's potential to generate revenue. 118 The San Diego Chargers, Kansas
City Chiefs, and the Green Bay Packers, for example, are considered small
market franchises (at least in comparison to teams in Los Angeles or New
York) but each has enjoyed historic and recent on-field success.
119
Meanwhile, the largest market by population, New York, has produced
two of the League's poorest performing teams over the past few120
seasons. The second largest market, Los Angeles, does not currently
have an NFL team, and the League has no immediate plans to expand or
relocate there.12
1
Other competitive disparities exist that are not attributable solely to
market size. The on-field success of a team and its resulting popularity,
regardless of the size of the team's market, may give some teams an
advantage in attracting and retaining the best players. 122  Players may
actually accept less money than they could get elsewhere to stay with or go
to a winning team, a team located in a large city, or a team with a
respected owner. The cumulative effect of years of on-field success in a
118. One reason the "large-market" theory may no longer hold true is because the on-field
success of the Cowboys and Forty-Niners may itself be responsible for making Dallas and San
Francisco into "large football markets," rather than the market size leading to their success.
119. The Chargers appeared in Super Bowl XXVIII and have a respectable record of 20-12
over the past two seasons. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 254. The Chiefs
played in two Super Bowls, winning one, and in three AFL Championships (one as the "Dallas
Texans"), winning each. Id. at 325, 332. The Chiefs had a regular season record of 22-10
between 1994-95 and 1995-1996. Id. at 253. The Packers are perhaps the most successful
"small-market" team in history, winning the first two Super Bowls and eight of the nine NFL
Championship games in which they played from 1936 to 1969. Id. at 325, 333. In the 1996
playoffs, the Packers defeated the defending Super Bowl Champion Forty-Niners en route to the
NFC Championship game, and also won Super Bowl XXXI in 1997. Id. at 334; Bob Oates,
Super Bowl: Green Bay Packers 35, New England 21, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at S3.
120. The New York Giants were 39-41 between 1991 and 1996, while the New York Jets'
record was even worse at 29-51. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 253-56.
121. T.J. Simers, Los Angeles Officials Walk Right into League's Trap, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
2, 1996, at C6.
122. For example, the Dallas Cowboys lured Deion Sanders away from the defending
Super Bowl champion San Francisco Forty-Niners in 1995 with a signing bonus of nearly $13
million. Bill Plaschke, Sanders Joins Cowboys for a Prime $25 Million, L.A. Times, Sept. 10,
1995, at Cl.
123. In signing with the Forty-Niners in 1994, Sanders rejected a higher paying offer from
the New Orleans Saints in favor of a better chance at a Super Bowl title, the ability to continue
his professional baseball career, and the higher visibility of the San Francisco sports market.
19971
466 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 17
system without a salary limitation has helped some teams offer
consistently higher salaries. 124  Arguably, teams such as the Dallas
Cowboys and San Francisco Forty-Niners can partially attribute their
successes on and off the field to the enormous amounts of money they
spend on player salaries, made possible by their unmatched revenue
generating potential.1
25
Just as the market size distinction is less indicative of on-filed
success, it is equally unsettled that the more a team spends on player
salaries, the better the team will perform. For example, the Oakland/Los
Angeles Raiders, the Miami Dolphins, and the Cleveland
Browns/Baltimore Ravens each have spent liberally on players over the
past few years with little on-field success to show for it. On the other
hand, one of the League's newest franchises, the Carolina Panthers,
followed the example set by the Cowboys and Forty-Niners, spent liberally
Peter Finney, 49ers Mortgage Future for Present, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 23,
1994, at DI.
124. According to the NFLPA, the San Francisco Forty-Niners had a payroll (including
salaries and bonuses) of more than $44 million in 1993, more than $34 million in 1994, and
more than $38 million in 1995. See Ira Miller, NFL's No-Cap Salary Cap: Most Teams Exceed
Limit, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1996, at Bi; David Aldridge, What Cap? Redskins Have Top
Payroll: $42.6 Million, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1994, at BI; Jack Brennan, Rebuilding the
Bengals, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 26, 1993, at Cl. During this time, the Forty-Niners added Pro
Bowl veterans Ricky Jackson, Richard Dent, Ken Norton, Jr., and Deion Sanders. See Rick
Gosselin, Prevent Defense: Points, Room to Run Are Scarce Against 49ers' Top-Rated Unit,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 8, 1995, at 14B.
125. On-field success is demonstrated by the teams' records between 1993 and 1996.
Forty-Niners: 34-14, one Super Bowl win; Cowboys: 36-12, three Super Bowl wins. 1996
RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 255-57, 325. Part of this success must be credited to
their ability to attract and pay for the highest priced and most talented players. The Cowboys
and Forty-Niners each have had a disproportionate number of players selected to the NFC's Pro
Bowl team over the past three seasons. In 1996-97, the Cowboys led the League with nine
selections, while the Forty-Niners had four. See Dave Goldberg, Again, the Pro Bowl Balloting
Is by Rote, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, at C2. In 1995-96, seven Cowboys were selected, along
with ten Forty-Niners. See 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 340. In 1994-95, the
Cowboys led the League with eleven selections, while the Forty-Niners were second with nine.
AFC No Pro Bowl Pushover, HOUSTON POST, Feb. 5, 1995, at B3. The off-field success of these
teams is demonstrated by the value of each franchise in 1996, with the Cowboys valued as the
most valuable sports franchise in the world at $272 million, and the Forty-Niners at nearly $200
million, fourth in the NFL. See Michael K. Ozanian & Pablo Galarza, How to Buy a Sports
Team, FIN. WORLD, May 20, 1996, at 53.
126. At one point, the Raiders had on their roster three Heisman Trophy winners: Marcus
Allen, Bo Jackson, and Tim Brown. See Chris Dufresne, Raiders Get an 'A 'for Plan B Pickups,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1990, at Cl. Despite exceptional talent, the Raiders have had only four
winning seasons in the past 10 years. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 253.
Likewise, the Browns/Ravens had the seventh largest payroll in 1995, doled out the second most
in bonuses, but finished 5-11 and failed to make the playoffs. Miller, supra note 124, at BI.
The Dolphins had the sixth largest payroll in 1995, shelled out more than $20 million in
bonuses, but finished 9-7 and failed to advance past the first round of the playoffs. Id.
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on draft choices and veteran free agents, and won its division in only its
second season.127
If this trend were allowed to continue, the NFL would be dominated
by a few popular teams, with fans perhaps losing interest in their local, but
noncompetitive, franchises. The same teams winning every year, as well
as the lack of interesting rivalries, would likely lead to an aggregate
decline in fan support and eventually the demise of the League itself. To
avoid such a fate, the owners devised the salary cap, hoping to stop the
more affluent teams from consistently outbidding less affluent teams for
the best and highest priced players, thereby increasing on-field• . 128
competition. Cap proponents theorized that, as a result of the increase
in competition, the popularity of the League and individual teams would
increase as well.
129
Regardless of whether the most important factor is market size or the
amount of money spent on players, the teams and the NFLPA have sought
to create a competitive balance, increase on-field competition, and off-
field economic equality by agreeing to the salary cap as part of the White
settlement and CBA in 1993.130 Ironically, teams have since found
creative ways to circumvent the very mechanism they so desperately
sought. As a result, the practices used by teams to circumvent the cap may
further diminish the possibility of league-wide economic and athletic
parity.
D. Cap Circumvention Techniques: Personal Fouls
Three techniques to circumvent the salary cap are widely used and
regularly criticized. The first technique is the practice of paying players
large signing bonuses and either prorating the entire bonus amount against
the cap over the life of the contract or deferring payment of the bonus,
along with cap liability, until later years. Related to the signing bonus
127. See Richard Justice, Panthers, Jaguars Draft Plans, Expand to Playoffs; Carolina's
Success is Timeless, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1997.
128. NFL spokesman Greg Aiello said "[tihe idea is to have a level playing field, and from
there, let [the] talent settle things .... " Babineau, supra note 5, at C13.
129. See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 48; see also David Rothstein, The Salary
Cap: A Legal Analysis of and Practical Suggestions for Collective Bargaining in Professional
Basketball, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 251, 275 (1994).
130. NFL spokesman Greg Aiello said,
The cap will create a level playing field for all the clubs .... We don't want
every team in our league to finish 8-8 ... [but] [w]e're looking to create a balance
that gives all the teams the equal opportunity to compete. We don't want
perpetual winners and losers because of... [the] system.
Babineau, supra note 5, at C13.
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problems, and perhaps largely responsible for their inequitable use, is the
accusation that "renegade" team owners use unfair tactics to increase their
own non-shared profits at the expense of the rest of the League and its
DGR. The second dubious technique is the practice of prorating signing
bonuses over extended contracts that include "voidable years," or seasons
not expected to be played by the player. The third technique involves
manipulating player rosters during the pre-season roster cuts to keep
veterans and rookies. A fourth technique, only alleged to be practiced,
involves the funneling of money to players through corporate sponsors.
1. Signing Bonuses
The most widely used technique to circumvent the salary cap is to
offer large signing bonuses to players. The bonus is prorated over the life
of the contract for salary cap purposes. 13 1 In other words, the total bonus
amount is divided by the number of years in the player's contract and,
under the terms of the CBA, only the prorated amount is applied toward a
given year's salary cap calculation. 132  For example, in 1994 the
Washington Redskins gave rookie quarterback Heath Shuler an eight-year,
$19.25 million contract that included a $5 million signing bonus. 3 3 The
actual salary counted against the team's 1994 cap, however, was only
$1.57 million, rather than the close to $6 million actually paid out by the
Patriots.' 34 Other deals are structured so as to count the largest portion of
the up-front bonus in the final years of the contract. Deion Sanders' 1995
contract with the Dallas Cowboys, for example, deferred most of his $13
million signing bonus to 1999.135
A player is enticed by the large amount of up-front money because
the bonus will provide financial security should he suffer a career ending
injury or a decline in skills before reaping the rewards of a lucrative but
long-term contract. Quarterbacks Bernie Kosar and Randall Cunningham
are examples of players with declining skills who benefited from signing
bonuses. Each player signed a contract with a $3 million bonus in 1989,'13
an amount neither one would likely earn if he negotiated with a team
131. See, e.g., Ozanian & Galarza, supra note 125, at 64.
132. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § 7(b)(i).
133. Switzer, Johnson Feud Irks Cowboy Players, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 1994, at
B6.
134. This figure represents a base salary of $945,000 plus $625,000 as a pro rata portion of
the bonus. Id.
135. Ozanian & Galarza, supra note 125, at 64.
136. MARTIN J. GREENBERG, I SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.07(10) (1993), at 324.
[hereinafter SPORTS LAW PRACTICE (1993)].
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today.137  Even owners are skeptical of the effectiveness of bonuses,
recognizing that they may mortgage the future of the franchise.
138
However, most teams are willing to take the risk. In 1995, twenty-five
teams spent more than the $37.1 million cap when bonuses were counted in
full, an average of approximately $42 million league-wide.' 39 The Dallas
Cowboys spent $40 million in bonuses alone in 1995.140
The San Francisco Forty-Niners may have started this "gold rush" in
1994 with the highly publicized signing of Deion Sanders.141 Although the
basic deal was a $1.134 million salary, incentives could have increased the
deal to $2 million.142  The "hidden" part of the deal, complained other
owners, was an option year worth an extra $5 million: a $3 million bonus
and a $2 million second year salary. 143 When questioned whether having
$5 million committed to one player for a possible second year threatened
the stability of the franchise, the Forty-Niners responded, "we'll cross that
bridge when we come to it.
' 144
In the end, the Forty-Niners signed Sanders, who in turn helped the
team win its fifth Super Bowl title. New Orleans Saints owner Tom
Benson, who had offered Sanders $17.1 million over four years said, "This
is a farce. The New Orleans Saints live by the book, and everyone else
should live by the book, including the San Francisco 49ers. ' 4  Saints
executive vice president Jim Miller added that "[t]he whole thing smells,"
but also recognized that he was not sure if it was a "matter of the 49ers not
disclosing the entire deal or the mechanics of the salary cap failing us."'
14 7
Perhaps the latter was closer to the truth. Forty-Niner president Carmen
Policy argued that what his team did was legal and that "[e]very team
137. In 1996, Cunningham was not even on a NFL roster, having been released by the
Philadelphia Eagles after the 1995-96 season. Cunningham to Announce Retirement, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1996, at C8. Kosar, on the other hand, was demoted to third-string quarterback
in 1996 with the Miami Dolphins. Jonathan Curiel, NFL Notes; Falcons Extend QB's
Suspension, Dolphins Tab Erickson as Starter, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1996, at E3.
138. See Ed Werder, 49ers May Fall out of Deion Race; Policy: Cowboys Set to Mortgage
Future, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Aug. 20, 1995, at 11; Finney, supra note 123, at D1.
139. Ozanian & Galarza, supra note 125, at 64.
140. Id.




145. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 326.
146. Finney, supra note 138, at DI.
147. Id.
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could have done what [the Forty-Niners] did. There are 10 to 12 teams
deferring more cap money to the future than we are."'
148
When teams are allowed to pay players large signing bonuses without
having to count it against the salary cap that year, the purpose behind
limiting teams' spending with a salary cap is rendered nugatory. Affluent
teams are still at an advantage in attracting talent because they can offer
the largest bonuses to players. In some instances, teams have promised a
large bonus to a player and then paid him the league minimum over the life
of the contract, planning to defer the actual payment of some or all of the
bonus to later, uncapped years. 149 In other words, the player receives the
security of a lump sum payment in the future, enticing him to sign with the
team, but the bonus is not counted against the cap until later. Ideally, the
player is traded before the season in which his bonus would count against
the cap, as long as another team is willing and able to assume that cap
liability.
For example, in 1995, Deion Sanders signed a $35 million contract
with the Dallas Cowboys that included a $13 million signing bonus.
150
The deal included Sanders making the league minimum for third year
players, $178,000, each year for three years. 15 1 It was thought that the
Cowboys would defer approximately $16 million remaining on the deal, as
well as a $6 million bonus, to 1999 (presumed at the time to be an
uncapped year). Alternatively, Sanders could exercise his option to leave,
taking his salary cap2 baggage with him after three seasons, effectively
beating the system. The underlying assumption was that many teams
would be willing to devote that much cap space to a player of Sanders'
caliber.
153
The League intervened, however, and required a contract
modification that would charge the Cowboys $6.2 million against the cap
148. Id.
149. The Dallas Cowboys and San Francisco Forty-Niners have used this method to
circumvent the salary cap, extending contracts and deferring payments until 1999, the year they
expected to be uncapped. Denne H. Freeman, Deion on the Defensive; Cowboys Say Ankle
Injury a 'Non-Issue, 'ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 12, 1995, at Cl.
150. Will McDonough, Cowboys off the Hook, NFL Sidesteps Court Battle over Sanders,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 1995, at 79.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Sanders was the 1994 NFL Defensive Player of the Year and has been selected to five
Pro Bowls in his eight seasons (one as a Dallas Cowboy, one as a San Francisco Forty-Niner,
and three as an Atlanta Falcon). Goldberg, supra note 125, at C2; Steve Rushin, Catch-21
(Deion Sanders), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 31, 1995, at 54; Ira Miller, Sanders Will Sign With
49ers One-Year, $I Million Deal and Will Be in Uniform for Sunday's Game at Los Angeles,
FRESNO BEE, Sept. 15, 1994, at DI.
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if Sanders was released in 1998.154 Additionally, the Cowboys were
charged another $411,000 against each year's cap. 1 5 Although the action
taken by the League was a step in the right direction, many thought the.. .. . 156
required modification was insufficient. To prevent these actions in the
future, the League and the NFLPA agreed that in cases where there is a
substantial disparity between the signing bonus and the player's salary, a
formula will be used to limit the application of the signing bonuses to
uncapped years. 157 This problem has also been partially addressed by the
League and NFLPA's agreement to extend the CBA through the year
2000, and to apply the salary cap to the 1999 season.' 58 However, teams
that relied on unfettered spending during that season will be forced to
restructure many deals.
The League's main problem with large bonuses is that, despite
pooled television, stadium, and merchandise revenues, some teams still
have greater opportunities to make money than others. 159  The
Sanders/Cowboys deal, for example, was made possible largely by cash
paid to Jones from side deals with Nike, Pepsi, and American Express (a
combined total of $57.5 million over ten years) to sponsor Texas Stadium
(the Cowboys home field), also owned by Jones. 16 0 Carmen Policy, Forty-
Niners' president, voiced his concerns about the situation, saying, "[w]hen
you're talking about the salary cap, cash is king. Left unchecked, his
(Jones') actions will not only put the salary cap out of control but will let
the competitive balance get out of control."'
6'
These side deals increased the ability of Jones and the Cowboys to
pay bonuses to players, more than $40 million in 1995 alone. 162 Other
team owners who do not own their stadiums simply lack this
opportunity. 163 Stadium revenues from luxury suites, sponsorship, parking




158. Pasquarelli, supra note 92, at Cl.
159. Sports writer John Helyar noted that in 1996 "[t]he NFL continues its drift toward one
class of teams with big stadium revenues and big competitive advantages and an underclass of
all the rest." John Helyar, Luxury Stadiums Draw Fans and Players, Too, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30,
1996, at B5.
160. Brian Allee-Walsh, Corporate Steamroller Picking up Steam, TtMEs-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Sept. 24, 1995, at C4.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The Carolina Panthers, for example, are expected to generate $30 million in stadium
revenues in 1996, second only to the Dallas Cowboys. Erik Spanberg, Panthers Field a Big
Winner, Bus. J. CHARLOTrE, June 24, 1996. The Panthers' high ranking may be a direct result
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and concessions are not split with other franchises, and are also excluded
from DGR calculation, giving teams that generate money in this manner
an unfair competitive edge. 165 The additional revenue, for example, allows
teams such as the Cowboys, Forty-Niners, Dolphins, Panthers, and other
teams that own their stadiums, to stretch salary cap limits by paying heft6
player signing bonuses that can be prorated over the life of a contract. "
As the Forty-Niners did in 1994-95, Jones' manipulation of the cap helped
the Cowboys win their fifth Super Bowl title.
167
2. Voidable Years
The sining bonus problem surfaces again in the area of the rookie
salary cap combined with the "new rage" in negotiations: "voidable
years." 169 Voidable years are extra years added to the end of a player's
contract that are eliminated upon the player's fulfillment of purposely easy
performance goals, making the player a free agent. Such a contract
enables a team to pay out a larger signing bonus and stay within the limits170 .
of the CBA's rookie salary cap. The rookie's signing bonus is paid to
the player up-front but is prorated over the artificially increased length of
the agreement when calculating the team's rookie salary pool.
171
Although immediately recognized as a "major loophole," voidable
years have been widely used since the creation of the CBA.172  For
example, in 1993, the New England Patriots signed quarterback Drew
Bledsoe to a six-year, $14.5 million contract with certain performance
goals that could void the final three years. 173 The contract included a $4.5
million signing bonus. 174 Under the terms of the contract, only one-sixth
of the bonus, or about $750,000, counted against the team's available
salary pool for rookies. His contract included a clause that would void the
of their decision to forgo public financing of the stadium, enabling them to sell permanent seat
licenses and retain all revenue they generate. Id. By comparison, most NFL teams have to
negotiate revenue distributions with the public agencies that own their stadiums. Id.
164. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXIV, § l(a)(iii).
165. Spanberg, supra note 163.
166. Id.
167. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 325.
168. CBA, supra note 2, art. XVII.
169. Rich Cimini, Coslet Warns Jones of Consequences, NEWSDAY, Aug. 3, 1993, at 101.
170. Tony Grossi, Bengals Do Battle Against the 'Void,' PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug.
8, 1993, at 9D.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Cimini, supra note 169, at 101.
174. Grossi, supra note 170, at 9D.
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final three years if he started fifty-five percent of the team's games or
participated in fifty-five percent of the team's offensive plays. 
75
Reaching either goal will void the final three years of the contract.
Without voidable years, $1.5 million of his bonus should have counted
against the team's rookie salary pool, leaving considerably less money to
sign other players' 
76
Some owners initially thought the voidable year concept was contrary
to the purpose of the rookie salary cap pool. Cincinnati Bengals general
manager Mike Brown, referring to requests by agents of rookies in 1993,
said, "[W]e're going to fight for the rules as we believe they were intended
to apply ... to us, the validity of the collective bargaining agreement is
more important than any one player."'177 Even before he drafted the team's
first player, Carolina Panthers owner Jerry Richardson said, "I think the
problems of voidable-year contracts are humongous. If you ask me
whether we'd let [a rookie] sit out all year if the agent insists on voidable
years, the answer is yes."' 7 Other owners are not as categorically opposed
to the concept, such as Arizona Cardinals owner Bill Bidwell, who simply
describes the use of the loophole as one of the many "nuances" one must
learn with a new system. In some instances, Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue has exercised his authority to void a contract he considers a
violation. He rejected the Seattle Seahawks' original contract with
quarterback Rick Mirer, ruling that the incentives were so "easily
attainable that they violated the spirit of the salary cap."'
180
Voidable years can creep into veteran contracts as well, albeit
impliedly. For example, in 1996 the Dallas Cowboys extended Pro Bowl
running back Emmitt Smith a new contract that paid him $48 million over
eight years, including a $15 million up-front signing bonus. 181 For Smith
to fulfill the contract he will have to play a total of fourteen years, a rare
feat for any player. 1 2 Regardless of whether he plays the length of the
contract, the Cowboys will only be charged a prorated amount against the
cap, rather than the $15 million bonus and one-eighth of the salary in 1996,




178. Peter King, First and Long, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1995, at 44.
179. Jack Magruder, Hearst Deal Adds an Ace to Card Deck, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 28,
1993, at 1C.
180. Id.
181. Terry Bannon, Smith Gets Cowboys' Latest Mega-Deal; Running Back Signs for 8
Years, $48 Million, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1996, at § 4.
182. Id. The 1996-97 season was already Smith's seventh in the League. Id.
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League and Super Bowl Most Valuable Player in 1993 and four-time
rushing champion, was undoubtedly persuaded by the lucrative offer to
stay in Dallas. 
83
Like signing bonuses for veteran players, the combination of bonuses
and voidable years for rookies or veterans renders the salary cap useless.
Teams can effectively pay new and current players whatever they can
afford and award larger contracts to keep up with the increasing salaries
demanded by first year players and players needing to be re-signed.
Voidable years are also less risky for the teams because if they cannot
afford a player's salary when he has reached the incentive, they can let him
go to another team via free agency.
3. Roster Roulette
"Roster Roulette" is one of the least criticized but most widely used
techniques. 184 It developed from a loophole in the CBA 185 that allows
teams to place a veteran player with four years experience on waivers
when rosters must be cut from sixty to forty-seven players during the pre-
season. 186 The released veteran becomes an unrestricted free agent and
can sign with any team, including the one that released him. 187 With that
in mind, teams strike pre-cut deals with qualified four-year veterans,
convincing them not to sign with another team. 1 8 The teams then use the
extra roster slots for younger players they covet, and re-sign the veterans
once the roster limit is raised to fifty-three players just twenty-four hours
later. ' 
89
Again, the possibility of inequitable results looms large. Teams with
winning records, the best chance at the Super Bowl, or in popular cities
seem to have veteran players willing to undergo the sometimes
embarrassing situation of being unsigned. These teams are better able
183. Id.
184. Ira Miller, Roster Roulette, NFL Style, May Be Played out Monday, FRESNO BEE, Aug.
29, 1993, at D2.
185. "Roster Roulette" is actually a combination of the effects of article XXII (provisions
regarding the waiver system) and article XXXIII (provision relating to roster size).
186. Miller, supra note 184, at D2.
187. CBA, supra note 2, art. XXII, § 1 (a).
188. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 184, at D2; Mike Chappell, Act of Trimming Roster a
Difficult Task for Colts, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 30, 1993, at B4.
189. Article XXXIII provides that NFL rosters, including active and inactive players, shall
not exceed 53 players and not go below 42, and the dates and actual numbers can be determined
by the clubs. See CBA, supra note 2, art. XXXIII §§ 1, 2 and 4; Miller, supra note 184, at D2.
190. See Miller, supra note 184, at D2.
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to maintain a number of young talented players as well as experienced
veterans.
4. Corporate Endorsement of Players
Corporate endorsement of players, although only alleged, represents
the darker side of cap circumvention, and it can occur in many ways. For
example, a team may make a "donation" to a large company like Nike or
Reebok (not counted against the cap); a player sought by that team then
receives an equal amount from the corporation for endorsement purposes.
A team could also simply emphasize to both the corporation and the player
the mutual benefit each could receive from the player signing with the
team.
These tactics are currently mere allegations from anonymous owners
and conspiracy-minded sports writers.191 When Deion Sanders received a
$1 million dollar raise from Nike after signing with San Francisco in 1994,
some accused Forty-Niner owner Eddie DeBartolo of foul play.
192
Likewise, the accusations shifted to Jerry Jones and the Cowboys when
Sanders signed with Dallas the same season that Nike outfitted Texas
Stadium with "more swooshs than a downhill ski race."
193
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING GAME
PLAN
To the chagrin of many team owners, the cap-controlled environment
they envisioned has simply not materialized. The goals of economic and
athletic parity, thought achievable if the League adopted a salary cap, are
far from realized. Much of the blame is being laid on teams employing the
above-mentioned techniques to avoid the very salary cap they fought to
obtain. The problem facing the League is that until actual technical
violations of the CBA are documented, or the teams agree to ban the
circumvention techniques, aggrieved owners will be left with little to argue
but that the "spirit" of the agreement has been violated. This Comment,
however, contends that another avenue of enforcement exists in the
"Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing."
191. See Sam Donnellon, From CPA to Swoosh King, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Sept. 19, 1995, at C1; Mike Fisher, NFL Report, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 17, 1995,
atC16.
192. Mike Fisher, Cowboys Report, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 2, 1994, at C16.
193. Brown, supra note 117, at IC.
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A. Common Law Creation
The use of this covenant to enforce the "spirit" of the CBA is made
possible in part by the broad application and interpretation historically
given to it by courts. It is well established that "[e]very contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and enforcement."' 194 Even, when not expressed in the contract, courts• • • 195 "o
have often found the term by implication. The duty is based on
fundamental ideals of fairness and equity, and its scope varies according to
the nature of the agreement. 196 However, to what extent this duty could
require a party to adhere to an agreement's "spirit" is uncertain.
The requirement of good faith and fair dealing has been described as
requiring a party to act or refrain from acting to achieve certain goals that
formed the impetus for the agreement. 197 Looking to the impetus for and
goals of the agreement to define the parties' duties dictates that perhaps
duties exist beyond those enumerated in the text. The drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") recognized that "[g]ood faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party . . ... 198 Additionally, the drafters of the U.C.C.'s good
faith requirements recognized that:
[s]ubterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith
in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be
justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be
overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require
more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith
is impossible, but the following types are among those which
have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit
of the bargain .... 99
This requirement of faithful adherence to goals of an agreement is
perhaps the most important feature for application of the covenant to the
CBA. Accordingly, some support exists for the proposition that if there is
a spirit of a contract, it is embodied in, and perhaps enforced as a function
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see also U.C.C. § 1-203
(1978).
195. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 550 (2d ed. 1990).
196. Id. at 551.
197. Id.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (emphasis added).
199. Id. at cmt. d (emphasis added).
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of, the intentions, goals, and the justified expectations of the parties when
the agreement was made.
Under this broad interpretation of the good faith and fair dealing
duty, each team that agreed to the CBA also agreed to perform in a manner
consistent with the intent, purposes, and goals of that agreement as well.
The CBA, when viewed simply as a contract between sophisticated parties,
is logically subject to these general principles of contract law. Thus it is
perhaps possible to equate actions that are inconsistent with the intent of
the parties to an agreement with a violation of that party's duty to perform
in good faith and to deal fairly. If so, the League may use this implied
covenant to enjoin the use of the various circumvention techniques.
Consistent with the notion that the good faith and fair dealing duty
may require a party to refrain from certain conduct, 20 as well as require
"faithfulness to an agreed common purpose, '2°1 it is arguable that teams
have breached this duty by purposefully seeking ways to avoid the purpose
of the salary cap. Bonuses, voidable years, and roster shuffling, each
described as legal "circumvention techniques" by the teams who employ
them, are certainly the kind of"[s]ubterfuges and evasions ... of the spirit
of the bargain" proscribed by the common law's view of the good faith
duty. 202 Use of circumvention techniques and loopholes with impunity
were not likely part of that common plan.
For example, by paying bonuses that other teams simply cannot
offer-money that does not count against the salary cap--some teams are
able to operate as if there was no cap at all. When teams use bonuses to
structure deals to lure and retain better players, teams that cannot offer
such bonuses are left without a chance to compete for the upper echelon
players. The "justified expectations" of the parties did not include a
situation where the Dallas Cowboys could spend more than $62 million in
one season, 203 effectively buying a Super Bowl victory. In fact, it is hardly
a coincidence that the two teams accused most of violating the spirit of the
cap, the Cowboys and Forty-Niners, have won four of the five Super
Bowls since the adoption of the salary cap in 1993.204 These results alone,considering the extent to which each team used circumvention techniques
200. FARNSWORTH, supra note 195, § 7.17, at 551.
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
202. Id. at cmt. d (emphasis added).
203. This figure represents $40.5 million in bonuses alone, and an additional $22.1 million
in player salaries and benefits. Dougherty, supra note 117. In fact, the next-highest paying
team was the Carolina Panthers at $48.7 million, with 10 teams at less than $40 million. Id.
204. Cowboys in 1993, 1994, and 1996; Forty-Niners in 1995. 1996 RECORD & FACT
BOOK, supra note 1, at 325-27.
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and CBA loopholes, may be evidence that a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing has occurred.
Other support exists for the use of this covenant in agreements
between parties such as the NFL and its member teams. In regard to
contractual undertakings with a franchise organization, one commentator
recognized that "it is black letter law that a partner or joint venture
member ... [has] a fiduciary duty not to act unilaterally to the detriment of
the venture."' ° Indeed, a franchisor (and franchisee) owes a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 206 Sports teams or member clubs have in fact been
found to owe "traditional fiduciary duties" to the other teams and to the
league as a whole.
20 7
Today, the NFL consists of thirty franchised entities. As such, each
franchise owes a fiduciary duty to the other franchisees and also to the
franchisor, the NFL. The negative effect on League-wide athletic and
economic competitiveness resulting from a team's circumvention of the
salary cap may be considered a breach of that franchise's "traditional
fiduciary duties"20 8 owed to the League and the other teams. This duty,
along with the requirement of good faith and fair dealing, proscribes
conduct by a franchise that is a "detriment to the venture."'209 Certainly,
actions that allow some teams to get richer-on and off the field-at the
expense of the other teams, are detrimental to the long term viability of the
League. Specifically, allowing a team to generate revenue in a way that
other teams cannot, such as the sponsorship deals Jerry Jones obtained
with Nike, Pepsi, and American Express, creates an NFL of "haves" and
"have-nots" which the CBA and salary cap system were designed to avoid.
B. Common Law Defenses
The likely targets of a claim that circumvention techniques breach the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are the Dallas Cowboys
and San Francisco Forty-Niners, the two teams accused most of violating
the spirit of the salary cap. Enforcing the salary cap through this external
means goes beyond requiring the teams to abide by the letter of the law
and actually includes seeking "performance" on the intent, purpose and
205. Roberts, supra note 18, at 977.
206. Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Mont. 1986).
207. Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 143 Cal. App.3d 410, 415 (1983).
208. Id.
209. Roberts, supra note 18, at 977.
FIRST DOWN, GOAL TOGO
goals of the CBA.2 10 This relief, equitable in nature, will be subject to
numerous objections.
1. Blitzing The Doctrine of "Unclean Hands"
One possible obstacle to the League's ability to force performance of
the CBA's intent, purpose and goals will be the doctrine of "unclean
hands." Courts have held that "he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands." 21' The doctrine played a role in an early professional
baseball dispute where the court explained that the doctrine of clean hand
forbids relief to "[h]e who has acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery and
deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness.., even though.
he may have kept himself strictly within the law.... ,,212
The doctrine of unclean hands has been applied to sports primarily in
two situations: (1) conduct of players; and (2) conduct of teams. The
second category is relevant here, where "improper conduct" has been held
to include any conduct stemming from dishonesty or improperly motivated
behavior. 21 4 Teams may use the doctrine to fend off the League's attacks
in two ways.
First, even assuming that a team can be shown to have breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it employs the
aforementioned circumvention techniques, most (if not all) of the other
teams in the League have also employed similar techniques. Therefore,
each team that employs such tactics will be individually barred from
seeking specific performance by the doctrine of unclean hands. Second,
because the majority of the teams will be barred by the clean hands
doctrine, the League, as representative of each team, may itself be barred
by the doctrine. Thus, the League, as a representative of teams who have
acted in bad faith, may be barred from challenging specific teams who
have acted in bad faith.
2. The "Pro Bowl of Lawyers" Defense
The Circumvention Clause is perhaps to blame for the toothless
enforcement ability of the CBA. However, it is uncertain whether a court
210. See supra Part II.C.
211. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945).
212. Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168, 171 (W.D. Mich.), af'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914).
213. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE (1993), supra note 136, § 2.06(1), at 164-65.
214. New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d
471 (5th Cir. 1961).
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will imply the covenant to undo its nugatory effect. Success on this claim
will rely heavily on a finding that the alleged violations were not
anticipated by the two sides of the agreement, a finding not likely in the
face of the term's very existence. In other words, if the use of the decried
circumvention techniques were not part of the parties' intention, they
would have been specifically banned. Surely the veritable pro bowl of
lawyers (for the League, players, and twenty-eight individual teams)
assembled for such a process would not have overlooked these important
considerations. Instead, the seemingly vague Circumvention Clause was
included, tacitly approving their use.
Courts have not always hastened to imply covenants to redefine the
parties' rights and obligations. In Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer
Chemical Co., 2 15 the Ninth Circuit refused to imply the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, in part because the parties to the agreement were
represented by sophisticated agents, lacking the possibility that one party
had "unequal bargaining power."216 Additionally, the Second Circuit has
stated that it does "not believe that the [good faith] requirement abrogates
the effect of the contractual terms" and that "parties may rely on the
express terms of their contract."'2 17 Accordingly, a court may be reluctant
to imply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to give the parties any
real enforcement power over the salary cap because each side was
adequately represented, reducing the possibility that one party had
"unequal bargaining power" over the other. 218 Indeed, the CBA, born of
the White settlement, received judicial approval in settling the class action219
lawsuit. If the parties wanted to prohibit the specific acts complained of
provisions (bonuses, stadium licensing agreements, etc.), they would have
done so in the CBA. Implying a covenant to ban their use after the fact
will be a difficult task for the League to accomplish.
215. 753 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1985).
216. Id. at 740.
217. Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citing Zullo v. Smith, 427 A.2d 409, 412 (Conn. 1980)).
218. See Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1985);
Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982); Corenswet, Inc. v.
Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir. 1979)).
219. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1390.
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C. The NFL 's Experience with the Implied Covenant
As early as 1890, courts recognized that sports franchises may in fact
owe a duty to perform their contracts in good faith."2  Nearly one hundred
years later in Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Commission v. NFL,221 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the NFL and its member
teams owe a duty of good faith to one another.222 That case may be an
important legal precedent for challenges on a claim that certain teams have
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It arose at a
time when the salary cap was but a glimmer in the eyes of the owners, and
the League had bigger problems at hand.
1. The Raiders Cases
In 1978, the Los Angeles Rams moved from the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum ("Coliseum") to Anaheim Stadium, 223 leaving the
Coliseum without a major sports tenant. Coliseum officials inquired of the
League Commissioner about a possible expansion franchise and also began
negotiations with existing teams in the hope of attracting one to Los
Angeles.2 2 4 The Coliseum ran into a major obstacle, however, in the form
of Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution.
225
In 1978, Rule 4.3 required unanimous approval of all twenty-eight
NFL teams whenever a team (or in the parlance of the League, a
"franchise") sought to relocate to the home territory of another team.
226
As defined by the rules, Los Angeles was still home territory of the
Rams.
227
220. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE (1993), supra note 136, § 202(2), at 135 (citing American
Ass'n Base Ball Club of Kansas City v. Pickett, 8 Pa. Cty. Ct. 232 (1890)).
221. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Raiders 1].
222. Id.
223. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.
1984) [hereinafter Raiders 1].
224. Id.
225. Rule 4.3 originally read:
Any transfer of an existing franchise to a location within the home territory of any
other club shall only be effective if approved by a unanimous vote; any other
transfer shall only be effective if approved by the affirmative vote of not less than
three-fourths or 20, whichever is greater, of the member clubs of the League.
Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1385 n.j.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1385. "Home territory is defined in Rule 4.1 as the city in which [a] club is
located and for which it holds a franchise and plays its home games, and includes the
surrounding territory to the extent of 75 miles in every direction from the exterior corporate
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The Coliseum viewed Rule 4.3 as an unlawful restraint of trade, in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act228 and sued the League in
1978.29 The district court concluded, however, that a present justiciable
controversy did not exist because no NFL team had committed to moving
to Los Angeles. 23  The NFL nevertheless saw the Coliseum's suit as a
sufficient threat to warrant amending Rule 4.3.231  In late 1978, the
Executive Committee of the NFL, comprised of a voting member from
each of the 28 teams, met and changed the rule to require only three-
quarters approval by the members of the League for a move into another
team's home territory.
232
Shortly afterwards, Al Davis, managing general partner of the
Oakland Raiders franchise, expressed his desire to move to Los
Angeles. 233 His lease with the Oakland Coliseum expired in 1978 and he• • 234
believed the facility needed substantial improvements. Unable to
persuade Oakland officials to agree to his terms, Davis instead turned to
the Los Angeles Coliseum.
Davis and Coliseum officials began discussing the possibility of
relocating the Raiders to Los Angeles in 1979. 235 In January, 1980, the
Coliseum believed an agreement with Davis was imminent and reactivated
its lawsuit against the NFL, alleging again that Rule 4.3 was an unlawful
restraint of trade and seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the League
from preventing the Raiders' move. 236  The district court granted the
injunction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction because
the Coliseum had made no showing of irreparable injury if the Raiders
were not allowed to relocate.
237
On March 1, 1980, Al Davis and the Coliseum signed a memorandum
of agreement outlining the terms of the Raiders' move to Los Angeles.
238
At an NFL meeting on March 3, 1980, Davis announced his intention to
limits of such city." Id. at 1384. The Big "A" in Anaheim is within the 75 mile limit. Id. at
1385.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
229. Los Angeles Mem'I Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
230. Id.





236. Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
237. Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (9th Cir.
1980).
238. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1385.
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move without seeking League approval pursuant to Rule 4.3.239 Over
Davis' objection and in spite of his allegation that Rule 4.3 still violated
antitrust laws, the NFL teams voted 22-0 against the move, with five teams
abstaining. 24 As a result, the Coliseum, joined by the Oakland Raiders as
a cross-claiming plaintiff, renewed its action against the NFL and each
member club.2 4  What followed was appropriately dubbed the "Super
Bowl of Litigation.
242
The first trial ended in a hung jury, and the case was then
bifurcated.243 In the first portion, a jury found the NFL and its clubs liable
to the Coliseum and the Raiders for antitrust violations (based on Rule 4.3)
and separately liable to the Raiders for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 244  The jury specifically found that the
covenant was implied under California law and thus read into the NFL
Constitution and By-Laws, and that the League breached it by not allowing
the Raiders to move to Los Angeles.
245
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the Raiders and
Coliseum breached the covenant by not seeking permission from the
League and that the League breached by not authorizing the Raiders'
move.246 The court determined that the Raiders could not recover under a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim
because the covenant "is 'reciprocal' [and] a 'two-way street' which
demands compliance from the contracting parties." 247 The court held that
neither the Coliseum, the Raiders, nor the League fulfilled this duty.
248
Important in the court's discussion was the recognition that the
implied covenant binds the parties to the NFL's contracts. Quoting the
California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held "[i]t is well settled that,
in California, the law implies in every contract a covenant of good faith
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1381.
242. Ken Hoover, Burlingame Lawyer Nominated for Bench, S.F. CHRON. Aug. 13, 1994,
at A]9.
243. Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1359.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1361.
247. Id. (quoting Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, 610 P.2d 1038,
1041 (Cal. 1980)).
248. Id. at 1361.
249. Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1361.
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and fair dealing." 250 The court further recognized that the "covenant not
only 'requires each contracting party to refrain from doing anything to
injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement ... but
also [imposes] the duty to do everything that the contract presupposes that
he will do to accomplish its purpose."'251 In the context of the Raiders
dispute, neither the team nor the League adhered to the purpose behind the
rules regarding relocation, namely the fair and orderly operation of the
League.
2. What the Raiders Cases Mean Today
The precedential value of the Raiders cases to future challenges to
League and team action is not certain. The Raiders II court made clear,
however, that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may require the
League and its franchises to perform in accordance with this common law
duty, at least as far as the League's Constitution and By-Laws are
concerned. 252 A logical extension of that rationale to other contracts and
accords between the same parties would be expected.
If the covenant is to be implied into the CBA, important questions not
answered by the Raiders cases must be examined. First, the Raiders
litigation involved an agreement between the League members. The CBA,
however, is an agreement between the players and the NFL. Because the
salary cap is found within the CBA, the question is whether each team
owes a duty of good faith in regard to its performance, or whether a duty is
only required by the League itself, in its contracting capacity as the teams'
representative.
Complicating the matter further, the position to be taken by the
NFLPA in an action to ban cap circumvention techniques is uncertain.
The players may take the position that, overall, they have benefited from
the cap circumvention techniques. 253 If so, teams that have circumvented
the cap will not have breached any good faith duty owed to the players
because the teams' actions will have actually fulfilled one of the NFLPA's
250. Id. (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166
(Cal. 1984)).
251. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added) (quoting Berkeley Lawn Bowling Club v. City of
Berkeley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 280, 286-87 (1974)).
252. Id. at 1361.
253. Despite the fact that salaries vary under the 1993 CBA, NFL players certainly gained
financial securities they lacked before the agreement, most notably the improved benefits
package, pension plan funded by the owners, and League-wide minimum salaries for teams and
individuals. Upshaw, supra note 5, at C15.
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goals: securing a larger piece of the League's DGR for the players.25 4 On
the other hand, many players have been released or asked to take pay cuts
for lack of salary cap room.255 The NFLPA may, therefore, take the
position that cap circumvention techniques actually hurt the players and
work contrary to the NFLPA's goals of full employment and increasing
aggregate player salaries. Thus, it will be crucial to determine whether
individual teams owe a duty that may require them to refrain from using
the cap circumvention techniques.
The likely answer is that each team owes an individual duty to the
League and the players to perform the terms of the CBA in good faith. It
is well recognized that a franchised organization, partner, or joint venture
member has a fiduciary duty not to act unilaterally to the detriment of the
venture. 256 This duty has been extended specifically to member clubs as
well. 257 Logically then, if the CBA or the League is considered a "joint
venture," individual NFL franchises are bound to act in accordance with
their "fiduciary duty not to act unilaterally to [its] detriment. . . ."258 If the
League is damaged as a result of the circumvention techniques, then these
renegade teams are certainly acting to its detriment. Regardless of these
concerns, the NFL may owe an independent duty to its contracting
counterpart, the NFLPA. The NFL, independent from what teams or the
NFLPA desire, may have to enforce the salary cap as a function of its own
good faith and fair dealing duty.
The next question left unanswered by the Raiders cases is whether
the Ninth Circuit's use of the implied covenant is binding on future cases
since it is only interpreting California contract law. The CBA has
expressly selected the state of New York for its governing law.
259
Importantly, New York law implies the duty of good faith and fair dealing
into every contract as well, 260 and may in fact imply a broader duty. One
court has held that "implicit in every contract is a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing ... which encompasses any promises that a reasonable
254. Pasquarelli, supra note 92, at IC.
255. See Upshaw, supra note 5, at C15.
256. Roberts, supra note 18, at 977.
257. "The law requires... [that] when [team] representatives sit on the board of directors.
they have a duty to make decisions for the benefit of the... league as a whole." Professional
Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415 (1983).
258. Roberts, supra note 18, at 977.
259. CBA, supra note 2, art. LIX.
260. Jaffe v. Paramount Comm. Inc., 222 A.D.2d 17 (N.Y. 1996); see also Carvel Corp. v.
Diversified Mgmt. Group Inc., 930 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1991).
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promisee would understand to be included . . .,,261 New York law
recognizes that the duty is "breached when a party to a contract acts in a
manner that, although not expressly forbidden by any contractual
provision, would deprive the other party of the right to receive the benefits• ,,262
under their agreement. Under this broad interpretation, a court may
find that the circumvention techniques deprive the League and teams of the
benefits of the salary cap: athletic and economic parity.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has followed the reasoning in
Triangle Mining, as well as the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
holing that the good faith provision may not be used to override explicit
contractual terms. 263 Such a reliance on the express terms of the contract
could emasculate the "spirit of the contract/good faith and fair dealing"
argument, especially in the face of the Circumvention Clause's tacit
approval of the vilified cap circumvention techniques.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the NFL is to continue its current growth, both economically and in
popularity, a more faithful adherence to the CBA will surely be required.
If the past four seasons are any indication, the current approach to salary
cap enforcement is likely to lead to a league with only a few teams having
a realistic chance of winning the Super Bowl, fewer meaningful and
exciting games, resulting in a substantial loss of fan support. To be sure,
teams like the Cowboys and Forty-Niners have each used the
circumvention techniques to their fullest, creating two of the most
powerful and profitable sports franchises in the world. 64 In the process,
they have confirmed the fears of the CBA's drafters that teams will follow
261. New York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 662 N.E.2d 763, 769 (N.Y. 1995) (emphasis
added) (citing Dalton v. Educational Testing Serv., 206 A.D.2d 402 (N.Y. 1994); Van
Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville v. Hayden Publ. Co., 281 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1972)).
262. Jaffe, 222 A.D.2d at 47.
263. Grand Light & Supply Co, 771 F.2d at 679 (citing Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1985); Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d
395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
264. The on-field power of the Forty-Niners and the Cowboys is evidenced by the fact that
the two have combined to win four of five Super Bowls since 1993, winning more games than
any other team during that time. 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 251-57, 325-3 1.
Off the field, the Dallas Cowboys are the most valuable sports franchise in the world at $272
million, while the Forty-Niners are valued at nearly $200 million. Ozanian & Galarza, supra
note 125, at 66.
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the letter of the agreement but that their conduct will be motivated by the
goal of circumvention.
The lack of athletic and economic parity among teams and the
concentration of on-field success and financial power in the hands of only
a few teams has many NFL observers and fans concerned. Many teams
face substantial economic losses and competitive ineptitude year after
year, and as a result lack the financial and intangible ability to put a winner
on the field. The financial inequity among teams can be blamed, at least in
part, for causing many teams to become as fickle as their fans. The notion
that "cash is king" has led franchises lacking the ability to generate that
cash to relocate to football-craving cities on the promise of greater
economic prosperity. When relocation is not available, teams instead
operate from a purely business perspective, where the bottom line is more
important than the goal line. Both franchise relocation and teams lacking a
commitment to winning turn the fans away, either because their team has
left town or because it is so bad they wish it would. If this trend continues,
and teams are allowed to ignore the purpose of the salary cap, the overall
impact on the popularity of the game could be drastic.
Unfortunately, until the CBA is modified or replaced, the
Circumvention Clause will remain an obstacle to strict enforcement of the
salary cap, and further diminish the chances of absolute economic and
athletic parity in the NFL. The extension of the CBA, as well as recent
modifications in response to the Cowboys' 1995 signing of Deion Sanders,
are perhaps a recognition that the system is fundamentally beneficial, but
that its current incarnation is less than perfect. In simply modifying the
current system rather than pursuing the uncertain and expensive plan of
enforcement litigation or renegotiation, the League has effectively punted.
Absent further agreements, perhaps the only way to enforce the cap will be
to look beyond the CBA, to general contract principles such as the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. If successful, use of the covenant
could require teams to adhere to the intent, purpose, and goals, as well as
the express provisions of the CBA.
The enforcement of the CBA through the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing may be one avenue to fulfill the goals of the salary
cap. Until the current CBA is modified to stop these practices, such a
course of action may indeed be the only possibility. What is clear,
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however, is that absent some effective enforcement mechanism, teams will
continue to run roughshod over the CBA and its salary cap leading to what




265. See Plaschke, supra note 11, at C3.
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